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Both environmental quality and health care expenditure are determinants of health and life expectancy, but 
the support for them appears to be different according to the electors’ age, with a relatively larger support 
for health expenditure among the elderly as it is generally effective on a shorter horizon than environmental 
maintenance.  With  population  aging,  the  political  support  for  health  care  expenditure  is  then  self-
reinforcing. We cast this issue in an overlapping generations model with endogenous longevity, where 
lifespan depends on health care expenditure and environmental quality. We compare the long run outcomes 
for health care expenditure, environmental quality, lifespan, consumption and capital accumulation of an 
economy where agents vote over health spending and environmental maintenance, with those chosen by a 
social planner who takes into account also the welfare of future generations. The role played by other 
factors,  such  as  the  propensity  for  smoothing  consumption  or  the  degree  of  annuity  markets,  is  also 
highlighted. Empirical evidence of age-biased environmental care is provided. 
Keywords:  population  aging,  endogenous  longevity,  environmental  and  health  expenditure,  annuity 
markets, inter-generational conflict, overlapping generations. 
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Many Western and industrialized countries are nowadays experiencing popu-
lation aging.1 In an aging society, the age structure of the electorate changes
as the number of the elderly voters increases, and consequently also the out-
come resulting from voting can be aected when age-sensitive issues are
concerned.
Elderly voters, who do not benet from long-term public policies, have
a preference for public expenditures which are more eective in the short
term, while young electors can appreciate policies yielding results over a
longer horizon. This is the case of expenditures that aect health status,
such as health-care spending and environmental maintenance. Both of them
contribute to improve health conditions: the benecial eect of health ex-
penditure straightforward, and and the positive role of environmental qual-
ity on health is well-documented as well (see EEA, European Environmen-
tal Agency (2007)). The support for environmental care is however more
widespread among the young2, likely because environmental friendly poli-
cies usually take more time to be eective, though often yielding long-lasting
results. As the old do not enjoy future environmental improvements, they
rather prefer health-care expenditures. It is worth highlighting since the
beginning that we are not claiming that the elderly are not interested at
all in environmental maintenance, but that they are interested to a smaller
extent than the young are.
What are then the consequences in terms of health-care expenditure,
environmental quality, life expectancy, consumption choices and welfare?
In what respects are they dierent from the outcomes that a social plan-
ner would implement? Moreover, what is the role, if any, played by social,
economic and technological factors, such as the degree of risk aversion, the
development of annuity markets, the eciency of environmental mainte-
nance, the polluting eect of production and the substitutability between
health-care expenditure and environmental quality? In order to assess these
questions we cast the issue in a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
(OLG) framework with endogenous lifespan depending on health status.
Health conditions, in turn, depend on the current level of health-care ex-
penditure and of environmental quality, which can be improved by environ-
1To mention the most relevant examples according to World Bank's data, in Japan the
share of population aged 65 years old or more has passed from 9.04% in 1980 to 19.75%
in 2005; in Italy, considering the same temporal interval, it has increased from 13.15% to
19.74%; in Spain from 11.21% to 16.83%.
2See Section 2 for empirical evidence.
1mental maintenance. Two dierent regimes are compared. The rst one is
a political economy where health-care and environmental expenditures are
chosen by the government to maximize the welfare of electors. In the sec-
ond one, the allocation of resources is chosen by a social planner who takes
into account the welfare of current and future generations and maximizes an
utilitarian social welfare function consisting of the discounted sum of indi-
viduals' lifetime utilities. Therefore, the political economy diers from the
social planner's approach in three main respects: rstly, the social outcome
is determined by the currently living agents only. Secondly, the weight of
the elderly component of the electorate is endogenously increasing as life
expectancy improves. Finally, the political economy operates in a market
framework where also the availability and the completeness of nancial in-
struments such as annuities can play a further role in shaping the outcome.
This work relates to dierent streams of the existing literature. Since
in our model lifespan is endogenous and dependent on both current health-
care expenditure and environmental quality, we refer to the literature on
endogenous longevity (e.g. Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), de la Croix and
Licandro (1999), Hazan and Zoabi (2006) and Cervellati and Sunde (2005)),
and in particular to papers that focus on health as the main determinant of
lifespan. In this respect, Chakraborty and Das (2005), for instance, postu-
late a positive relationship between the survival probability and the private
health investment and show that, in the absence of annuities markets, the
resulting interplay between income and mortality can be instrumental in
generating poverty traps. Other works (cfr Chakraborty (2004), Osang and
Sarkar (2005) and Bhattacharya and Qiao (2005)) model health as provided
by the government through public measures. We share this feature but,
whereas they assume an exogenously-given tax rate to fund health-care ex-
penditure, in our model agents vote over taxes and their use. Moreover,
following Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) and Ono and Maeda (2002), we
allow for the existence of imperfect annuity markets, in order to assess the
impact of a change in their degree of completeness on the social outcome.
Nevertheless, in this theoretical literature the crucial role of environmen-
tal quality on health is usually neglected, as health is usually modelled as a
one-argument function, i.e. the health-care expenditure.3 On the contrary,
there are several state-of-the-art empirical studies which show that the en-
vironmental conditions have a signicant impact on individuals' health: e.g.
3A longevity function depending on two arguments is used in Finlay (2006), but the
second one is an exogenous baseline survival probability, whilst in our paper both the
arguments are endogenously determined.
2Bell and Davis (2001); Pope and al. (2002); Evans and Smith (2005); Kat-
souyanni et al. (1997); poor water quality: see Sartor and Rondia (1983);
climate change: see Kunst, Looman, and Mackenbach (1993)). Two remark-
able exceptions in the theoretical literature are models by Jouvet, Pestieau,
and Ponthi ere (2007) and Pautrel (2008). Jouvet, Pestieau, and Ponthi ere
(2007) set up an OLG model in which longevity is assumed to be aected
by both environmental quality and health spending. A higher longevity has
a direct benecial eect on welfare and an indirect negative one, since it re-
duces the quantity of space available for each person. Since the latter eect is
not internalized and environmental maintenance is not possible, the model
yields an over-spending in health and hence the rst-best policy involves
a positive taxation on health-care expenditure.4 Dierently from Jouvet,
Pestieau, and Ponthi ere (2007), we do not postulate any space-crowding ef-
fect and we allow for environmental maintenance as an alternative measure
to promote longevity. Though the causes of Jouvet, Pestieau, and Ponthi ere
(2007)'s health-overspending are removed in our paper, over-spending in
health can still result: the reason being the age-composition of voters, as
the policy implemented by the government is endogenous and dependent
on electors' interests.5 Pautrel (2008) using an OLG model  a la Blanchard
(1985) with human capital accumulation explores how the optimal growth
path is inuenced by the detrimental eects of pollution on life expectancy.
In his model the policy that the government implements is not subject to
voting, so the government is able to fully correct market externalities.
We also relate to the literature dealing with the intergenerational polit-
ical divergence with respect to the level and the composition of taxes. Pre-
vious studies on environmental policy in OLG models (see, e.g., John and
Pecchenino (1994); John et al. (1995)) assume that the political decision-
making as regards environmental policy is undertaken by a short-lived gov-
ernment representing the currently living young, ignoring the more and more
important political role played by the elderly, due to population aging. The
relation between longevity and the environment is considered by Ono (2005)
who analyzes the eect of increasing agents' lifespan on political decision-
4The second-best levels for the taxes on capital income and on health spending depend
instead on various factors, such as the intensity of preferences for environmental quality
and the pollution process: the optimal tax-rates turn out to be higher when emissions are
larger or when agents' impatience is low.
5Another remarkable dierence is that in Jouvet, Pestieau, and Ponthi ere (2007) only
the young do invest in health, whereas in our model health-care expenditure is intended for
the elderly people only. Both assumptions are extreme and made for analytical tractabil-
ity as models work through simplications; however, supporting health-care provision is
commonly one of the prior political item for retired and elderly voters.
3making as regards environmental policy and nds that, in the presence of
imperfect annuity markets, a greater longevity has no eect on the envi-
ronmental tax and a non-positive eect on the environmental quality. Ono
(2005), however, posits that lifespan is exogenous.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we investigate for empirical
evidence of age-biased environmental care. Section 3 sketches the model.
Section 4 describes the equilibrium in the political economy. Section 5 deals
with the case of the social planner and compares analytically the two solu-
tions. Section 6 provides numerical analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
Is there empirical evidence for the assumption that the old care about the
environment to a smaller extent than the young do? Previous researches,
although not specically focused on the eect of age, have included among
the control variables a proxy for the possible impact of age. Holman and
Coan (2008) including the median age in a county level dataset nd no
signicant eect, but Kahn (2002) at dierent levels of analysis nds that
the young have higher environmental preferences and he comments this re-
sult as related to the greater patience and willingness to accept short run
sacricies. Fort and Bunn (1998), in their analysis of referenda on nuclear
power, nd that opposition to nuclear plants was greatest in counties with
a younger population. Thalmann (2004), using individual data and control-
ling for other subjective characteristics, observe that environmental concern
is signicantly lower among elderly people (60 years or more) than among
people aged between 30 and 59.
All these studies are generally based either on data aggregated at county
or state level (e.g.: Holman and Coan (2008), Salka (2001)) or - especially
for European-based studies - on individual data within the context of a
single country (Thalmann (2004)). The dataset we use oers instead the
opportunity to carry out an empirical analysis based on individual obser-
vations from respondents of dierent nationalities. The data are from the
Special Eurobarometer 217/EB62.1/2004 'Attitudes of European citizens to-
wards the environment (2005). The survey is described more in details in
Appendix A.1. Amongst the survey's questions, we are interested in the
following one: \In your opinion, to what extent do the state of the envi-
ronment inuence your 'quality of life'?". Respondents could give only one
answer scaled from a value of 1 (the lowest inuence) to a value of 5 (the
highest)? We label as env imp2 such a variable describing the importance
4of the state of the environment for the quality of life.
For the sake of convenience we restrict the sample to respondents older
than 24 years. The reason is twofold: on the one hand, this allows to be
closer to our theoretical implications;6 on the other hand, this allows to
simplify the treatment for some variables because of the way in which the
question was made (e.g. education, see footnote 14).
A synthetic representation of the dataset is provided in Table 1.7 At the
top of the table it is reported the sample distribution of env imp2, which
shows that the majority of EU citizens rates the state of the environment as
very (or at least quite) important in determining the quality of their life. For
the purpose of our analysis it is useful to create also the dichotomic variable
(env imp) which groups env imp2 the positive answers on the one side and
the negative ones on the other (see Table 1). As long as age is concerned, the
dataset provides the age class of the respondents, shown in Table 1 as age.
We can see that the sample is well balanced, being each age class roughly
equally represented. As before, it is useful to aggregate the variable age by
taking into account the demographic structure of our theoretical framework.
Therefore we group the respondents aged 25 to 54 years old and we label
them as \the young"; while respondents aged 55 years or more are grouped
together as \the old". This new variable is labeled agegroup.8
In Appendix A.2 it is shown that the proportion of those considering
the quality of environment as highly important (\a lot or more") is greater
within the young than within the elderly group, and that the dierence is
statistically signicant according to several tests.9 However, it could be that
this happens because of the presence of correlates that are not taken into
account. In order to address this issue, we take advantage of other variables
available from the survey to perform an econometric analysis which allows
to control for the possible eects of other determinants of environmental
care, such as the level of education, the gender, the living area, whether the
respondent has children, etc.
Education and political opinions are commonly found to have a signi-
6In the model, agents work during their rst period of (active) life, so empirical corre-
spondence should be seeked disregarding the youngest people.
7In Table 1, all the observations for which the answer was \don't know" or a refusal
are set as missing values for that variable and they are not shown.
8It can be observed that a half of the population is represented by those we called
the young (51.01%), while only a third of the respondents fall in the group we called the
old (36.14%). Although splitting the sample in more precise age groups would have been
preferable, the aggregation shown in Table 1 is the most accurate one, given the structure
of the data.
9See Appendix A.2 for details.
5Table 1: Variables in the dataset
Dependent Variables Freq. Percent Cum.
env imp2 not at all 760 3.58 3.58
not much 4,477 21.10 24.69
quite a lot 9,798 46.18 70.87
very much 6,180 29.13 100.00
env imp not much or less 5,237 24.69 24.69
a lot or more 15,978 75.31 100.00
Age variables
Age 25-34 3,996 18.50 18.50
35-44 4,393 20.34 38.84
45-54 4,254 19.69 58.53
55-64 3,975 18.40 76.93
65+ 4,983 23.07 100
Agegroup 25-54 12,643 58.53 58.53
55+ 8,958 41.47 100.00
Control variables
education no-full time education 89 0.42 0.42
15 or less 5,402 25.42 25.84
16-19 8,941 42.07 67.91
more than 20 6,561 30.87 98.78
still studying 259 1.22 100.00
gender male 9,487 43.92 43.92
female 12,114 56.08 100.00
area rural area or village 8,178 38.00 38.00
small or middle sized town 7,830 36.39 74.39
large town 5,511 25.61 100.00
ospring 0 15,347 71.05 71.05
1 2,961 13.71 84.76
2 or more 3,293 15.24 100.00
children 0 15,347 71.05 71.05
1 6,254 28.59 100.00
polview left 1,599 9.31 9.31
centre-left 3,691 21.49 30.80
centre 7,151 41.64 72.44
centre-right 3,355 19.53 91.97
right 1,379 8.03 100.00
leftright left 5,290 30.80 30.80
centre 7,151 41.64 72.44
right 4,734 27.56 100.00
eu15 0 7,963 36.86 36.86
1 13,638 63.14 100.00
6cant impact on the attitudes toward environmental issues. A high educated
person can better appreciate the consequences of certain human eects on
the environment, or she can make a stronger connection between social wel-
fare and the environment (see Van Liere and Dunlap (1980), Thalmann
(2004), Kahn and Matsusaka (1997)).10 The role of partisanship and more
in general political views on environmental position seems to be quite ro-
bust across studies based on dierent approaches and samples (e.g. Guber
(2001), Holman and Coan (2008)). Besides education and political opinions,
one could expect that living in more polluted areas might make the envi-
ronmental conditions a more pressuring issue (the \dierential exposure"
channel, see Tremblay and Dunlap (1978)).11 We also include a dummy for
living in one of the countries which made up the core of the European Union,
because many of the new Members States have been experiencing remark-
ably high levels of pollution (especially Eastern Europe countries), while in
the EU-15 members green laws have a longer tradition.12 Moreover, it is es-
pecially interesting to control whether having children has any eects, since
altruistic agents might rate environmental conditions important not only for
themselves but also for their ospring's well-being. In our model agents are
assumed to be non-altruistic and altruism can be a way for departing from
the implications arising from the political economy setting we put forward
in Section 4 and 6.
Let us now briey comment the control variables reported in Table 1
and how they are coded. The variable education consists of answers to the
question \What age did you leave school?". We use this piece of information
rst by grouping the classes into three categories and then by constructing
a set of dummy variables. The rst group is represented by those who
attended no full-time education or left school when they were less than 15
years old,13 The second group is made up of those who left school when
10Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) suggests the further link that less educated workers are
generally those who suer more from policies of environmental protection, either because
of direct consequences on their employment situation or because of the additional compe-
tition of less skilled workers displaced by aected industries.
11Salka (2001) suggests that people from rural areas can be less concerned with envi-
ronmental issues not only because they are less exposed to pollution but also because they
are usually more economically dependent on industries which use natural resources.
12Given data unavailability we could not control directly for income, though it is usually
correlated with education. Previous studies, however, do not nd a robust evidence for
the impact of income: while, for instance, Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) nd that income
matters, but in Thalmann (2004) such a conclusion is not supported as income is not a
clear-cut determinant of the acceptance of green taxes.
13Grouping the class of those with no full-time education with the immediately upper
class is a matter of convenience, since the no full-time education class is made up only of
7they were at least 15 and younger than 20, while the third group joins those
who left school when they were at least 20 years old and those who are still
studying.14 Then the dummies mededu and hiedu are created, where the
former is 1 if the respondent was at least 15 years old when leaving school
(so the second and the third groups), and the latter is 1 when the respondent
stopped full-time education when she was aged at least 20 years or if she is
still studying (so only the third group).15
The variable gender takes the value 1 if the respondent is a female, the
dummy variable eu15 is 1 if the respondent is a citizen of one of the EU-15
countries, the dummy variable children is 1 if the respondent has at least one
child less than 15 years old living in the household. By means of dummy
variables we include the qualitative variables area (the living area of the
respondent, which is classied either as \rural area or village", or \small
or middle sized town", or \large town") and leftright (the political views,
classied as left, center, right).
Results
We consider a probit model where the dependent variable is env imp
and an order probit model where the dependent variable is env imp2. All
coecients are signicantly robust to the replacement of the assumption of
a normal distribution with a logistic one.16
In the rst two columns of Table 2 the coecients of the probit regression
with the dependent variable env imp can be observed. In the rst column the
regressor for age is represented by the dichotomic variable agegroup, while
in the second column age is represented by the more analytical variable age.
The coecients are all robust to the use of dierent proxies for the controls.17
The coecient of agegroup is negative and 99% signicant, supporting the
idea that the elderly group feels a relative lower concern for environmental
conditions than the young.
89 observations out of a total of 21,252. The regressions' results are robust with respect
to keeping distinct these two classes.
14Including the answer \still studying" in the highest level of education is appropriate as
the sample is restricted to people aged 25 or more. Out of 259 still-studying respondents
after the sample's restriction, 210 are less than 35 years old, 37 between 35 and 44 years
old, while only 12 are distributed in the eldest age classes.
15Therefore hiedu by referring to a subset of mededu should capture the marginal eect
of the highest class of education.
16Logit regressions results are available from the authors upon request.
17The results obtained by using dierent proxies are omitted for the sake of brevity but
available upon request. In particular, the regressions have been performed by substituting
leftright with a more detailed set of dummy variables for the political views (polview),
and by replacing children with several alternative measures (log of number of children,
number of children, a separate dummy when children are at least two, etc.).
8Table 2: Probit analysis
Probit regressions Order probit regressions
env imp env imp2
agegroup -0.0822 *** - -0.0708 *** -
(0.0253) (0.0200)
age - -0.0256 *** - -0.0257 ***
(0.0091) (0.0072)
center-parties -0.0360 -0.0366 -0.0292 -0.0298
(0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0199) (0.0199)
right-wing parties -0.0697 ** -0.0712 ** -0.0354 -0.0359
(0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0220) (0.0220)
mededu -0.0338 -0.0326 -0.0018 -0.0042
(0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0226) (0.0228)
hiedu 0.1364 *** 0.1354 *** 0.1596 *** 0.1584 ***
(0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0197) (0.0197)
female 0.0410 * 0.0416 * 0.0291 * 0.0295 *
(0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0169) (0.0169)
small town 0.0755 *** 0.0753 *** 0.0432 ** 0.0431 **
(0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0195) (0.0195)
big city 0.1459 *** 0.1450 *** 0.1441 *** 0.1429 ***
(0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0217) (0.0217)
children 0.0252 0.0265 0.0202 0.0160
(0.0268) (0.0274) (0.0210) (0.0214)
eu15 -0.1901 *** -0.1085 *** -0.0405 ** -0.0406 **
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0181) (0.0181)










Number of obs = 16678 16678 16678 16678
LR 
2
(10) = 118.00 105.27 188.01 186.90
Prob > 
2 = 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R
2 = 0.0064 0.0057 0.0046 0.0046
*: 90%; **: 95%; ***:99%
9Another signicant coecient is the one of the highest class of education
(but not that of the intermediate one), suggesting that only the highest level
of education has a clear positive impact on environmental care. Women ap-
pear to care signicantly more than men about environmental conditions18,
while citizens of the new Member States are more likely to be concerned with
environmental problems than citizens of EU-15 countries, probably because
of the high levels of pollution that these countries have been experiencing.
Furthermore, left-wing people are found to be signicantly more concerned
than right-wing ones (but not than center-parties sympathizers).19 Living
in towns, especially if big, has an impact on environmental concern, likely
because of the greater exposure to pollution.20 Finally, we notice with in-
terest that having children turns out to have no signicant impact (even if
the sign is positive) on the environmental care as measured by env imp.
It is now interesting to check whether the results are robust to a more
disaggregated classication of age classes. This is done in column 2 of Ta-
ble 2 by using age. Although in absolute value the coecient for the age
variable gets smaller, it is still negative and signicant. All the other re-
sults commented for column 1 are substantially conrmed. This provides
support for the assumption that the concern for environmental problems is
decreasing in age.
However, it might be that, even if the old caring for environmental con-
ditions are less, their care could be deeper. Therefore, we use the variable
env imp2, which provides a more disaggregated statement of the environ-
mental care. Since in env imp2 four ordinal levels of environmental concern
are expressed, we perform order probit regressions. Similarly to column
1, column 3 considers age as represented by agegroup, while in column 4
(similarly to column 2) age is used.21 The negative sign and the statisti-
cal signicance for the coecient of the variable capturing the age eect are
conrmed also by the order probit approach. Age is found to have a negative
impact on environmental care also when the latter is divided into 4 classes
of opinion. Being left-wing people is no more signicant in determining the
attitudes towards the environment. Results for the remaining coecients
18This result contrasts with Thalmann (2004), who nds no gender eect on environ-
mental concerns.
19A similar role of leftist anities is found by Daugbjerg and Svensen (2001).
20This result is in accordance with what found by Holman and Coan (2008) who use
as a regressor the share of people in the county living in rural areas, and by Thalmann
(2004) dealing with Swiss citizens' votes on environmental policies.
21Here again results revealed to be robust to the use of dierent variables as controls.
See footnote 17.
10are substantially conrmed as well.22
Hence, as we can see from the probit analysis, even after controlling for
the eects of other variables, age seems to be a signicant determinant of
the attitudes of the respondents towards the environment.
3 The Model
As our analysis focuses on intergenerational issues, an overlapping genera-
tions model seems to provide a suitable framework. We consider an innite
horizon economy where agents live two periods. We denote by generation
t the cohort of agents born at t, with t = 1;2;3;:::. Each new-born gen-
eration has the same size, that we normalize to 1, and agents belonging to
the same generation are assumed to be identical. As in Bhattacharya and
Qiao (2005), the length of the rst period of life is given and normalized to
1, while the length of the second period, p() 2 (0;1), depends on the agent's
current health condition h.23 Therefore, life expectancy of an agent born at
t can be written as: 1 + p(ht+1).
Alternatively, as the number of agents is large, p() can be seen as the prob-
ability of living throughout the whole second period. Moreover p(ht) can
be seen as the old-young ratio at time t.24 Usually, in the literature on
endogenous longevity p(h) is assumed to exhibit the following properties:25
p0(h)  08h; p00(h)  08h; lim
h!0
p(h) = 0; lim
h!1
p(h) =  p  1
where the notation p0(h) (p00(h)) denotes the rst-(second-)order derivative
of p w.r.t. h.
22The coecient of eu15 goes from 99% to 95% signicance, as well as the the one of
living in small towns.
23Note that, since p() 2 (0;1), the lived portion of the second period is always shorter
than the rst period's. This implication is realistic, since the rst period begins when an
agent enters the working age and covers a large part of it, while the second one includes
the retirement period (See Section 6 for a numerical transposition of model periods into
number of years). Even if life expectancy can be enlarged substantially by improvements
in health, it is expectable that in reality the working age increases as well, thus keeping
valid the implication of a shorter expected portion of life in the second period.
24Dierently from others in the existing literature (e.g. Finlay (2006); Chakraborty and
Das (2005)), we do not interpret p() as a mortality shock at the end of the rst period.
The dependence of p() on the second-period health status can be found also on Osang and
Sarkar (2005).
25See Chakraborty and Das (2005), Osang and Sarkar (2005), Bhattacharya and Qiao
(2005), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000).
11Combining the evidence for sizable eects of both environmental quality
and health-care expenditure on lifespan, we assume that the representa-
tive agent's health status is endogenously determined by the current envi-
ronmental quality (denoted by an environmental index E) and by current
health-care expenditure gt: ht = h(Et;gt). The function h() is assumed to
be increasing in its arguments at decreasing rates, i.e. for all E;g:26
h()  0; h0
E  0; h0
g  0; h00
EE  0; h00
gg  0
It is therefore possible to express the length of the second period as a function
(Et;gt). Combining the properties of p(h) and h(g;E), the characteristics
of the function (Et;gt) are summarized by Properties 1:
Properties 1 (Properties of the longevity function) For the longevity
function:
(Et;gt)  p(h(Et;gt))  t (1)
the following properties are given:
1. 0
x  0; x = fE;gg; 8Et;gt
2. 00
xx  0; x = fE;gg; 8Et;gt
3. t 2 (0;1) 8Et;gt
Individuals
As in Ono (2005), since we are not interested in intragenerational issues,
we assume that individuals derive utility only from the second-period con-
sumption level. In this way individuals' decision-making can be left apart
and we can focus only on the political economic equilibrium. The lifetime
utility of the representative agent born at time t is
Ut = t+1u(ct+1) (2)
that is the utility she gets from consumption ct+1 weighted by the length of
her life. The following assumptions on u() are made
8c > 0 : u(c) > 0; u0(c)  0; u00(c)  0
where the rst assumption is sucient to ensure a worth-living life.27
26Often, only one determinant of health is considered. In Finlay (2006), where the
health function has two inputs, the same conditions given in the text are assumed.
27See Chakraborty and Das (2005). As it is always possible to add a positive constant
to a utility function without altering the preference system this assumption does not seem
restrictive.
12In the rst period of life individuals supply to rms an inelastic amount
of labour xed to 1 and get paid at the competitive wage wt. As agents do
not consume in the rst period, they fully save and in the second period
they receive an interest rate rt+1 on the top of their total savings st: the
second-period total income before taxation amounts to: (1 + rt+1)st.
In a deterministic set-up, individuals know exactly their lifespan and, in the
absence of any altruism, they consume everything during the portion of the
second period they live
t+1(ct+1 + o
t+1) = (1 + rt+1)(wt   
y
t ) (3)
where y and o are the lump-sum taxes levied by the government to fund
health-care spending and environmental maintenance (see Section 4.1), and
(wt   
y
t ) represents net savings.
When individuals do not know their lifespan with certainty, part of their
savings ends up to be \unrealized". In particular, out of the total risen
amount (1 + rt+1)st, a part 1   () can be unrealized, as it refers to a span
where the agent is dead.28 The unrealized amount is accordingly
(1   t+1)(1 + rt+1)st
. When complete annuity markets are available, a rational non altruistic
individual can neutralize the death risk by purchasing annuities (see Pec-
chenino and Pollard (1997)).29 With annuity markets, as long as an agent
is alive, she receives an extra rate of return  on her savings funded through
the unrealized savings of dead purchasers, so that the eective interest on
savings is: 1 + rt+1 + t+1. Basically, the portion of savings that would be
unrealized is used to increase wealth as long as agents are alive. However,
the degree of completeness of annuity markets is generally not perfect and
can vary among countries and time.30 Following Ono (2005) and Pecchenino
and Pollard (1997) we assume that only a fraction  2 (0;1) of unrealized
savings can be annuitised, while the remaining part, 1   , is passed on to
the next generation as unintended bequests, b. In this general set-up the
28Looking at  as the probability of surviving throughout the whole second period, there
is a probability (1   ) of un-enjoying the savings.
29A life annuity is an insurance product by which the insured person receives periodically
a sum as long as she lives, in exchange for a premium charge. It allows agents to insure
against the risk of outliving their savings, given the uncertainty of her remaining lifetime
by pooling the mortality risk across annuity purchasers. See Mitchell et al. (1999).
30This may occur for a number of reasons which are surveyed by Brown and Whar-
shawsky (2001). See also Chakraborty and Das (2005).
13agent is subject to the following budget constraint
ct+1 + o
t+1 = (1 + rt+1 + t+1)(wt + bt   
y
t )
Assuming perfect competition, equilibrium in the annuity markets re-
quires
t+1t+1st = (1   t+1)(1 + rt+1)st (4)
which means that the total payment in extra return (the l.h.s. of Eq. (4 )
is equal to the total amount of available funds (the r.h.s. of Eq. (4). Eq.





The portion (1   ) of unrealized savings goes to the next generation as
(unintended) bequests:
bt+1 = (1   )(1   t+1)(1 + rt+1)st (5)
By combining Eq. (5) with Eq. (4) the agent's budget constraint can be
rewritten as:
o
t+1 + ct+1= (1 + rt+1 + t+1)  (wt + bt   yt) =
(1 + rt+1)

(1   )t+1 + 
t+1






In the two extreme cases of complete ( = 1) and absent ( = 0) annuity
markets, the budget constraint simplies to:
 = 1 : o






 = 0 : o
t+1 + ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)[wt + (1   t)(1 + rt)st 1   
y
t ] (8)
When annuity markets are complete, the return on savings is increased in a
way inversely proportional to the agent's survival probability. On the other
hand, when annuity markets are absent, all the unrealized savings (which
are higher the lower is ) are passed on to the next generation. Eq. (7)
is the same as Eq. (3): with complete annuity markets the death risk can
be neutralized and each individual faces the same budget constraint as in
a deterministic set-up. This happens because the eect of annuity markets
is basically to shift income from the portion of life that is not lived to the
14lived one. On average, all the income risen from the rst-period savings can
be used in the portion  of the second period, exactly as it happens under
certainty. At the other extreme, when annuity markets are complete, the
amount of savings that would nance consumption in the portion 1    of
the second period is transferred to the next generation.31 By allowing for
incomplete annuity markets by means of the parameter  we are able to take
into account both channels.
Firms
We assume that the total output in the economy, Y , is produced by
perfectly-competitive prot-maximizer rms adopting a c.r.s. technology
with labour L and capital K: Yt = F(Kt;Lt). It is possible to rewrite the
production function in intensive form, since it is homogeneous of degree one
and labour supply is normalized to 1. Moreover, by assuming that capital
fully depreciates after one generation, the production function in intensive
form becomes
yt = f(kt) (9)
where yt and kt are output and capital per worker respectively, and f(k) 
F(K;1). Assuming perfect competition in the factor markets, the prot-
maximization problem yields the following factor prices
wt = f(kt)   ktf0(kt) (10)
rt = f0(kt)   1 (11)
Environment and Capital Dynamics
The state variables of the economy are the environmental quality E and
capital k. The law of motion of capital is given by the equilibrium relation
between savings and investment.32 As we have assumed full depreciation of
capital, net savings determine the capital stock in the next period
kt+1 = st (12)
As far as the environment is concerned, following Ono (2003) and Jouvet
(1995) we assume that the environmental quality can be worsened by eco-
nomic production and improved by environmental maintenance, according
31Intuitively, as agents do not know exactly when they die, they tend to keep something
away, which is then transferred to their children once they actually die.
32Notice that every variable is expressed per young agent and that the young cohort
size is constant.
15to the following law of motion33
Et+1 = Et   yt + (mt);  > 0 (13)
where mt is the investment in environmental maintenance. The parameter
 is related to the impact of economic production on the environment (e.g.
units of emission per unit of production). The function () is increasing
in mt and captures the eciency of environmental investment. While Ono
(2005) assumes a linear technology, we model a more general framework,
imposing the less restrictive conditions
8m : 0(m)  0; 00(m)  0:
When limm!0 0(m) ! +1, a minimum level of positive environmental
maintenance is always needed.
4 Political-Economic Equilibrium
In the political economy health-care expenditure and environmental main-
tenance are provided by the government and funded through lump-sum tax-
ation. We denote such a regime by PE, in contrast with PL. From Section
5 onwards we refer to a social planner economy where also the welfare of
future generations is taken into account. In PE the expenditures on health-
care and environmental maintenance are usually chosen by the government
under the constraints of limited time horizon and political support.
4.1 Government
Assuming that the government is entitled to both health-care and environ-
mental expenditures is fairly reasonable as one can think that each individual
is small and see her contribution to maintenance as negligible.34 Moreover,
the environmental quality can be thought of as a public good, being largely
non rival and non excludable.35 As regards health-care expenditure, in most
33Notice that Jouvet (1995) uses a natural decay rate. This avoids unit roots in envi-
ronmental dynamics but, since it is not well-established that the environment deteriorates
spontaneously, following Ono (2003) we do not introduce any natural decay rate.
34This approach is the same of John and Pecchenino (1994), while Jouvet, Michel, and
Vidal (2000) assume that maintenance is chosen privately.
35The sub-optimal provision of environmental maintenance in a decentralized setting is
shown by Jouvet, Michel, and Vidal (2000) in the so-called \subscription equilibrium",
where each agent takes as given the amount of public good provided by the others.
16countries it is principally funded through public funds, with the remarkable
exception of the USA, where the private share is larger.
In order to nance health-care and environmental investment, the gov-
ernment levies taxes both on the young and the old to full its budget
constraint. For the sake of analytical tractability, we make the assumption




t = mt + tgt (14)
where y;o denote the tax levied on the young and the old, respectively.
The government aims to maximize the overall welfare of the electorate:
its objective is represented by a social welfare function 
t equal to a weighted
sum of the indirect life-time utility of current voters:

t = #tUt 1 + Ut = #ttu(ct) + t+1u(ct+1) (15)
where #t stands for the weight that the government assigns to the old gener-
ation. Eq. (15) is consistent with a probabilistic voting set-up where electors
vote over i
t, mt, and gt (see de la Croix and Doepke (2009)).37
As in Ono (2005), we assume rational expectations and myopic decision-
making. Rational expectations ensure that the environmental policy taken
at time t is consistent with the realized scal policy at time t + 1. Due to
myopic decision-making, however, the government ignores the impact of cur-
rent policies on future political decisions. Put it dierently, the government
36Alternatively, Ono (2005) assumes that the government levies a proportional tax on
production, which is then shared between workers and capitalists according to the in-
puts' share. However, this set-up makes the dynamics more complicated as it involves
expectations over future tax-rates, thus making the analytical treatment more dicult
and without providing any further substantial insights. Similarly, in order to keep the
set-up as simple as possible, we abstract from the possibility that the government could
run a decit by issuing debt securities.
37Dierently from majority voting where, as long as preferences are single-peaked, each
agent votes with probability 1 for a policy and eventually it is the position of the median
voter that matters, under probabilistic voting the electors have a probabilistic distribu-
tion for voting over dierent policy-variables. This intuitively accounts for the role of
\ideology" in determining the voting choice. Under such a voting scheme the winning
party (the government) implements a weighted social welfare function like in Eq. (15).
Hence, with respect to majority voting, probabilistic voting allows for a smoother aggre-
gation of preferences and can be applied either when preferences are single-peaked or not.
Moreover, majority voting in our framework would imply the implausible outcome of a
\dictatorship" of the young, as they are homogeneous and in a greater amount than the
old. Nevertheless, our setting can be adapted to a majority voting scheme by assuming
that the relative preference for health-care expenditure over environmental maintenance
is continuously distributed across the population and increasing in age.
17in period t correctly forecasts future policies in period t + 1, but it ignores
the eect that its own decisions have on the equilibrium path. Hence, for
example, gt+1 is taken as exogenous by the government at time t, whereas
it will be a control variable for the government at time t + 1.
Dierently from Ono (2005), however, we do not postulate that the old have
an exogenous political power; on the contrary we assume that each voter has
the same weight, so that #t is equal to the share of old people in the economy,
i.e. t. By using Eq. (1) and (2), the objective function of the government
can be rewritten as

t = 2(Et;gt)u(ct) + (Et+1;gt+1)u(ct+1) (16)
While gt has a positive impact on the lifespan of the old, mt is valuable for
the life expectancy of the young, since it positively aects Et+1 through Eq.
(13). The outcome of the voting process is a weighted sum of the interests of
these two groups. The weights are not constant but endogenously aected
by the process of aging, which shifts political importance towards the elderly
electors.
4.2 Inter-temporal Equilibrium
The maximization of Eq. in (16) occurs in the context of a competitive
economy in intertemporal equilibrium. By substituting into the r.h.s.of Eq.
(12) the expression for savings appearing as the last factor in Eq. (6), by
replacing the factor prices by means of Eq. (10) and (11), by using Eq.
(12) lagged one period to replace for st 1 and nally Eq. (14) to take into
account the government budget constraint, the following law of motion for
capital holds
kt+1 = f(kt) ktf0(kt)[ +(1 )(Et;gt)] [mt +(Et;gt)(gt  o
t )] (17)
The environmental law of motion is the same as in Eq. (13).
From Eq. (6), by replacing the market-clearing conditions for factor
prices in Eq. (10) and (11) and by using the government budget constraint
(14) to get rid of 
y
t , we obtain
ct+1 = f0(kt+1)kt+1







As in Ono (2005), we dene an economic intertemporal equilibrium for




t=1 as a sequence of
lifespan, allocations and prices ft;ct;kt;Et;st;bt;wt;rt;tg1
t=1 with initial
18conditions k0 > 0;E0 > 0, such that individuals' utility is maximized, rms'
prots are maximized, the government's budget constraint is met, markets
clear and Eq. (17) and (13) hold.
4.3 Voting over health-care and environmental expenditure











































The derivation of the rst-order conditions for the PE problem, which is



























  is introduced to keep a synthetic
notation; t represents the complement to 1 of the elasticity of marginal
productivity of capital. In the particular case of a Cobb-Douglas production
function: yt = Ak
t , then 8t t =  and  represents the capital share of
output.38
Eq. (20) represents the Euler's equation for the PE case. It puts in
evidence three main channels through which longevity plays a role on the
voting outcome. The rst channel is a capital accumulation enhancing ef-
fect (represented by t+1, the rst term on the r.h.s.), which is related to
the larger life expectancy of the young generation. The second channel is
moving in an opposite direction, hindering capital accumulation: it is due to
38In Assumption 1.2 we refer to such a particular case for the sake of analytical tractabil-
ity.
19the political weight of the old (represented by t on the l.h.s.), who are less
interested to capital accumulation and are net user of health-care provision.
The third channel is eective in the presence of annuity markets, it reduces
the extra returns on savings since there are more people alive. The degree
of completeness of annuity markets is important because this latter eect
(represented by t+1 inside the square brackets on the r.h.s.) contrasts the
rst channel and fully osets it under perfect annuity markets. Since  is en-
dogenous, these channels are simultaneously taken into account and the life
expectancy itself results from the optimization problem. Keeping longevity
constant, an increase in the degree of annuity markets would increase capital
accumulation.
Eq. (21) concerns the marginal eects of increasing health-care expen-
diture. This has a cost for the old in terms of foregone consumption, repre-
sented by the l.h.s. of Eq. (21). On the other side, there is a positive eect
since health-care provision enlarges the lifespan of the current old genera-
tion, thus increasing its total utility and its political weight (the rst term
in square brackets in Eq. (21)39). There is also a negative eect (the second
term in square brackets) related to the increased absorption of resources by
the old generation, which reduces those available for the young.
The eects of marginal changes in environmental maintenance are shown
in Eq. (22). The r.h.s. represents the net gain of increasing mt through
its eect on the lifespan of the young generation: this entails a benet in
terms of larger utility and, in the presence of annuity markets, a cost due to
lower extra-returns on savings. The l.h.s. shows the cost borne by the old in
terms of marginal utility of consumption, when more resources are devoted
to maintenance. Such a cost is larger the larger is t, because it is related to
the political support from the old, who do not benet from environmental
maintenance.40
It is now convenient to introduce some assumptions on the explicit func-
tional forms, in order to go further into the analysis. They are summarized
in Assumption 1. In Section 6 more general functional forms will be consid-
ered by means of numerical examples.
Assumption 1 The following explicit forms and values are assumed:
39Note the number 2 that is referred to this double eect.
40Once again, it is worth remarking that this extreme assumption is done only for the
sake of simplicity. The main qualitative eects still hold if also the old benet from mt,
as long as they do that to a smaller extent than the young.






;  2 (0;1) (23)
2. The production function is:
f(k) = Ak A > 0;  2 (0;1) (24)
3. The survival function  is:
(Et;gt) = $g
tE1 
t ;  2 (0;1); $ > 0 (25)
4. The maintenance technology is linear:
(m) = m;  >  > 0; (26)
5. Annuity markets are absent:
 = 0
Eq. (24) and (23) are quite familiar. The former is the standard Cobb-
Douglas production function, while the latter is a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility function, where the parameter  is
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption,
thus being a measure of preference for consumption smoothing. In a non
deterministic set-up,  can also be interpreted as the coecient of relative
risk aversion and Eq. (23) as a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility. The restriction  2 (0;1) is enforced in order to guarantee a positive
value for human life, so that life is worth living.41
The Assumption 1.3 is useful, because it implies that the elasticity of t
with respect to gt is constant and equal to the coecient . This specication
still satises Properties 1.1 and 1.2, while Property 1.3 cannot be satised
for all t as eventually it would imply a vanishing elasticity. However, since
all variables (included g and E) take a nite value in the steady state, it
is always possible to ensure that, by considering a $ small enough,  is
between 0 and 1 in a neighbourhood of the steady state.
41Such a restriction is made in Chakraborty and Das (2005) as well. This has also
the further implication that the savings function is increasing in the gross interest rate.
However, in our framework, with no rst-period consumption, this eect does not appear.
21Concerning Assumption 1.4, a linear maintenance technology is the most
used functional form in the reference literature and it implies that the
marginal impact of maintenance on environmental quality is constant.42
The restrictions on  and  are made to guarantee that investing in en-
vironmental maintenance is worthwhile and feasible.43
Finally, by Assumption 1.5, annuity markets are absent. Besides allowing
some simplications, such a case is not unrealistic as in many countries
annuity markets are far from being complete.44. This restriction implies that
a large amount of unrealized savings is in fact transferred to the currentl
young generation.45 In Section 6 the role of annuity markets is assessed by
allowing for a strictly positive .
By applying Assumption 1.3 to Eq. (21), we have the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1.3, at any t, the ratio of health-care
expenditure over consumption (gt=ct) is larger for a larger  and/or for a
larger .










Proposition 1 states that resources are diverted from consumption to-
wards health-care expenditure when longevity becomes more elastic to health-
care spending. In addiction, health-care expenditure grows relatively to
consumption when the preference for consumption smoothing increases or,
under the alternative interpretation of , when agents are more risk averse
(that is, they prefer to consume less in exchange for a lower risk). In the
42With such a technology, a corner solution with no maintenance cannot be excluded a
priori.
43See Eq. (32) hereinafter.
44See Brown (1999), Milevskya and Young (2007). The very low level of annuitised
assets has been labeled as \annuity puzzle". Possible explanations are the presence of
bequest motives, adverse selection issues, risk pooling within family, high load factors
by companies, presence of Social Security, ination risk, ignorance and regulatory im-
pediments (see Brown (1999)). From a technical viewpoint, we could alternatively have
obtained some simplications by assuming the opposite case ( = 1) which, however,
would have been more unrealistic.
45A rough way of introducing dynastic bequests in the model could be indeed through
a negative shift in .
22next paragraph we will focus on the steady-state solution to the PE problem
under Assumption 1.
4.4 PE steady state
In the steady state, the environmental quality E must be constant. From
Eq. (13), we thus have that the level of maintenance is determined only by
the relation between cleaning and polluting technology:
m =  1(f(k))
This implies that the following four-equation system is sucient to deter-
mine the steady-state values of k;c;g;E:
1 =































where Eq. (29) is obtained from the law of motion of capital (17) evaluated
at the steady state and taking into account the consumer's budget constraint
(18). Now, let us consider the PE steady state under Assumption 1.



























The l.h.s. of Eq. (34) represents the PE feasibility set (denoted by PE),
i.e. what is available for consumption and health-care expenditure, once
capital and environmental quality are kept constant. Since k and m can
23now be determined autonomously, PE is independent of c;g and E and
the steady-state values of m and k can be obtained by Eq. (32) and (33),
as shown in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, k does not depend on the environmental
parameters, while m is increasing in  and decreasing in . The maintenance
share of output is constant: m=y = =.
The feasibility set PE is given by:











PE is increasing in  and decreasing in .














The rest of the proposition follows by replacing m and k in the denition of
PE and by taking partial derivatives. 
The sub-system (34)-(36) determines g;c;E as an allocation of PE
between g and c, such that E is steady and consistent with the optimizing
conditions. We can now establish the PE steady-state relation between E
and g, as presented in the following proposition:







(1   )(1 + )

(40)
E=g is decreasing in  and , while it is increasing in .
Proof: The result comes from Eq. (36) and partial derivatives. 
Proposition 2 conrms two intuitions: if lifespan becomes more elastic
with respect to health-care expenditure (a larger ), then g will grow rel-
atively to E. On the contrary, if maintenance becomes more eective ( a
larger ), then E will grow relatively to g. A third result is less intuitive: a
greater  reduces E relatively to g. The rational behind this is that, when
 is large, there is a preference for living longer (see Proposition 1), which
24can be due - according to the interpretation of  - either to risk aversion
or to a propensity for consumption smoothing. In the PE case such a goal
implies a larger political weight of the old and, hence, a larger increase in
health-care spending than environmental quality.
Moreover, Assumption 1 allows to nd an explicit solution for all the
steady-state variables. They are summarized in the following Lemma, while
the intermediary steps are left in the proof.




1 (1   2)1 (2 + 1   )
PE (41)
c =




(   2 )
1   (1 + )
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[(1   2) ]
1 
2 (1 + )

2 PE
1 + 2   
(44)
Proof: See Appendix C.1. 
Since an increase in  makes living longer more desirable, c decreases
(see Eq. (42)) and  increases (see Eq. (44)). As for the two inputs of , the
health-care expenditure unambiguously increases (see Eq. (41)), while the
environmental quality increases only provided that  is suciently low (see
Eq. (43)),46, because when  is very large it is worth pursuing the objective
of living longer just through increasing g.
If maintenance technology improves (a larger ), the impact on E is obvi-
ously positive, whereas the eects on g and c are ambiguous: on the one
hand, there is a negative substitution eect (a better environmental qual-
ity becomes \cheaper"), nevertheless on the other hand there is a positive
eect since, ceteris paribus, a lower level of m is needed to keep E steady,
thus freeing resources and enlarging the feasibility set. The overall im-
pact of  on  is however positive. This implies that an improvement in
environmental-maintenance technology is always benecial (see Eq. (44))
for life expectancy, without necessarily increasing health-care expenditure.
46More precisely: @E=@ > 0 ,  < 1=2(1+). All the partial derivatives are omitted
for the sake of brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
255 Social Planner Equilibrium
The PL case represents a rst-best approach, which consists in solving the
optimization problem of a social planner who takes care of current and future
generations. The planner treats each agent within a given generation equally
and discounts future generations by an exogenous and constant factor  < 1.
The planner's optimization problem diers from the PE solution in three
main respects: rst, also future generations are taken into account. Second,
the weight attached to the welfare of each generation is not aected by the
age structure of the population; nally the planner is not constrained by
market equilibria.











Such a problem is subject to two constraints. The rst one is represented
by resource feasibility:
yt = (Et;gt)(ct + gt) + mt + kt+1 (46)
at each period the outcome has to be divided among consumption, health-
care expenditure, environmental maintenance and capital accumulation. The
other resource constraint is the environmental law of motion, given in Eq.











+ vt+1(Et   f(kt) + (mt)   Et+1) + z1tmt + z2tgt
o
(47)
with E0;k0 given and mt  0; gt  0. The Lagrangean multipliers for
k and E are, respectively, q and v, which represent the shadow values of
relaxing the constraints on capital and environment; while z1t and z2t are
the Khun-Tucker multipliers of environmental maintenance and health-care
expenditure respectively which, at interior solutions, are always zero. For
the sake of simplicity we focus on interior solutions and work with the La-






f(kt)   (Et;gt)(ct + gt)   mt

  qtkt+
+ vt+1(Et   f(kt) + (mt))   vtEt (48)
26The derivation of the rst-order conditions for the PL problem, which is






























Eq. (49) is the Euler's equation in an environmental economy with
maintenance. Without the environment the terms in parenthesis on the l.h.s.
would simply amount to 1; with the environment, instead, the polluting
eect of production and the contrasting eect of maintenance are taken into
account. Eq. (50) highlights the relation between health-care expenditure
and consumption; while Eq. (51) shows the optimal condition concerning
improving environmental quality through m.
Comparison of the PE and PL intertemporal equilibria
Let us now compare the 3-equation system for the PL problem (Eq. (49)-
(51)) with the one for the PE case, i.e., Eq. (20)-(22). These two systems
refer to optimal intertemporal conditions in the most general forms: for
both cases they are derived under a general equilibrium approach, so that
they include indirect eects and are readily comparable. Next, we apply
Assumption 1 also to the PL set-up, in order to nd the steady-state solution
and contrast it with the PE one obtained in Section 4.4.
We start from comparing the conditions concerning capital accumula-
tion, i.e., Eq. (49) and (20). It can be readily seen how dierent are the
forces in place in the two cases. Whereas in PL the polluting eect of pro-
duction is taken into account, this is not the case in PE where none of the
electors is interested in Et+2, thus producing an enhancing eect on capital
accumulation.47 Another important dierence is related to the presence of
annuity markets in PE: a higher degree of annuity markets tends to reduce
the total savings, because of less intergenerational transfers, but increases
the eective returns on them. Note that, using a general equilibrium ap-
proach, it is important to make such indirect channel emerge.48
47This eect is partly contrasted by the one operating through t and going in the
opposite direction. In PE, indeed, the incentive to accumulate capital is reduced, as returns
are decreasing and factors' owners are remunerated according to the marginal productivity
of their respective factor. Such an eect is taken into account by the government in the
maximization problem.
48In a partial equilibrium set-up the eect of aging on intergenerational bequests or on
27As for environmental maintenance, we compare Eq. (22) to Eq. (51).
The last term in curly brackets on the l.h.s. of Eq. (51) represents the cur-
rent shadow-value of Et+2.49 Only the planner internalizes the long-lasting
benecial eects of investing in maintenance, whereas the short-lived gov-
ernment is interested only in the eects on Et+1, since no current elector is
aected by the environment of two periods later. This eect tends to reduce
the maintenance investment in PE. However, the planner takes into account
also a negative eect of increasing lifespan of the current young generation
(the negative term in square brackets in Eq. (51)), i.e. consumption and
health-care expenditure in the next period will increase as well, thus ab-
sorbing more resources which could be potentially accumulated for future
generations. On the one hand, because of its short-term horizon, in PE
the government has no concern with such an issue, but on the other hand,
it faces the competitive-equilibrium constraint on annuity markets, which
implies that a larger lifespan tends to reduce the extra-return on savings.50
Finally, the comparison of Eq. (21) and Eq. (50) allows to assess the
dierences in the relation between health-care expenditure and consumption.
They are pretty similar but with a substantial dierence: the level of u(ct)
appears doubled in Eq. (50). This occurs because in PE rising g has not
only the direct eect of increasing the welfare of the old, but it has also an
indirect aging eect of enlarging the number of old electors and their political
weight. The dierence appears even more clearly under Assumption 1, as
can be seen in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In PL, under Assumption 1, the health-care expenditure to











At any t the ratio of health-care expenditure to consumption is larger in
PE than in PL.














annuity-markets returns would have been neglected.
49This is formally shown in Appendix B.2: see Eq. (77) and Eq. (80).
50Hence, the negative eects of increasing too much lifespan are widely dierent in PE
and PL. Although these eects go in the same direction, it is not possible to establish a
priori which one is greater.
28By using points 1 and 3 of Assumption 1 into the expression above, Eq. (52)
is obtained. By comparing Eq. (52) to its PE counterpart, Eq. (27), it is
easy to see that the r.h.s. of Eq. (27) is always larger. 
In PL, as well as in PE, the g   c ratio is larger the higher are the
propensity for consumption smoothing () and lifespan elasticity to g ().
However, this ratio is always greater in PE than in PL, because of a self-
reinforcing eect between health-care spending and political support: in
PE an increase in health-care expenditure improves the lifespan of the old
generation and enlarges the number of electors supporting health-care ex-
penditure the most. This mutual channel pushes gt higher than in PL, where
the weight associated to the interest of each generation is exogenous (cap-
tured by the discount factor  and not dependent on ).
A remarkable implication of Proposition 3 is that, when  is low, the dif-
ference between the two solutions is more remarkable because, whilst the
planner substitutes easily health-care with consumption, in the PE frame-
work this is not done since the support for spending in g is kept high by an
aging population. Therefore the PE outcome is less sensitive to changes in
preferences for consumption smoothing or risk-aversion, as there is a kind
of political lock-in eect.
5.1 PL Steady State
In PL steady state, k and m can be determined autonomously from the
following sub-system derived from Eq. (13) and Eq. (49):51








The solution is provided in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 In PL the steady-state level of k does depend on the pollution/maintenance
parameters; k is decreasing in , while the eect of  on m is ambiguous;
both k and m are increasing in .
Under Assumption 1.4:
 k is increasing in ; m is decreasing in  (increasing in ) i: = <




51Note that, while in PE we had to make Assumption (1.5) to isolate k and m from the
other equations of the steady-state system, this is not necessary in PL.
29 The feasibility set in PL is:






















 < 1  
, the output y and feasibility set  are both larger in PL.
Proof: See Appendix C.2. 
Lemma 3 highlights that, if production becomes more polluting (a larger
), the steady-state level of capital is reduced and, under conditions iden-
tied in Lemma 3, the environmental maintenance is increased in order to
preserve the environmental quality. Similarly, when maintenance technology
becomes more eective (a larger ), capital can increase and, under certain
conditions, the environmental maintenance can decrease. The eects of 
and  on m are ambiguous: on one side it is necessary to spend more on
maintenance in order to oset the pollution induced by the same level of pro-
duction, but on the other side the output itself is reduced, so the amount of
available resources is lower. Under Assumption 1.4 we can see that, unless
the pollution coecient is fairly high compared to the maintenance coe-
cient, an improvement in  allows to reduce m and to have a larger k.
Moreover, if the pollution coecient is suciently small compared to the
maintenance coecient, we obtain that the feasibility set is larger in PL
(PL > PE), thus implying more resources available for health-care expen-
diture and consumption. Finally, note that the larger is the weight attached
to future generations (), the larger is production as well as environmental
maintenance (needed to oset the greater pollution).
Let us now assess, also in the PL case, the steady-state values for the
remaining variables, i.e. E;g and c, by means of Assumption 1. They
are provided by the following system, which denes the allocation of PL
between c and g, such that E is steady and optimization conditions are
satised:






















30Eq. (56) is the resource constraint, Eq. (58) follows straight from Eq. (52),
and Eq. (57) is obtained from Eq. (51).52. From this system we can derive
the following proposition which contrasts the E  g ratio of PL with that of
PE.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, in PL the relative intensity of E with
respect to g (i.e., E=g) is increasing in , while in PE it is decreasing.
Provided that  is suciently large, E is used more intensively in PL than
in PE.














Proof: See Appendix C.3. 
Therefore, in PL  is found to have a positive eect on the E   g ratio
while its impact is negative in PE (see Proposition 2). Why is this the
case? As in PE, a larger , meaning a higher degree of risk-aversion or a
greater propensity for consumption smoothing, implies a greater importance
of living longer in exchange of giving up some consumption. This objective,
however, is pursued by the planner through the health input showing more
long-lasting eects, i.e. E. In PE, instead, living longer does come mainly
through health-care expenditure, because of the political channel highlighted
in the previous section.
Moreover, the PL solution turns out to feature a larger E   g ratio for
a suciently high . Since increasing the environmental quality takes more
time than g to improve health conditions but has more persistent eects,
the less is discounted the future (the larger ) the greater is the relative
advantage of spending on the environment. Hence, provided that the planner
does not discount heavily the future, in the long-run the environmental
quality will be higher in PL than in PE, where the optimization problem
faces a shorter horizon and it is constrained by the political claims of electors
caring more for g.53















0(mt+1). Then considering all
variables in steady state yields Eq. (57).
53Note that there are also similarities between the PL and PE solution for the E   g
ratio. For instance, in both cases, E=g is increasing in  and decreasing in . The rationale
behind this nding is quite intuitive, since  captures the eectiveness of maintenance while
 is the elasticity of lifespan to health-care expenditure.
31Moreover, under Assumption 1 the PL steady state admits an explicit
solution just like for the PE case. The following lemma summarizes the
roots for the system (56)-(58):

















































Proof: See Appendix C.4. 
As shown in Lemma 4, also in PL an increase in  shifts resources from
consumption to the lifespan inputs (i.e.: E and g). A better environmental
maintenance technology (), for a given PL, shifts resources from c and g
to E; while a greater elasticity of  to g () lowers the environmental quality
and increases the health-care expenditure. For a given PL, a larger  shifts
resources from g and c towards a better environmental quality.
From Eq. (63) it can be seen that the eects of parameters ,  and  on 
are all positive, while the eect of  is ambiguous, as in the PE case. Since
PE does not depend on , Eq. (63) can also be read as suggesting that, if
 is suciently high, then PL can be larger than PE.
6 Numerical Analysis
In this section some restrictions made in Assumption 1 are relaxed and the
steady-state values in the two regimes are studied numerically. In this way,
on the one hand robustness of results obtained under Assumption 1 can be
checked under more general functional forms and, on the other hand the
eect of other elements of the model, neglected for analytical tractability,
can be assessed. In particular, we refer to the degree of annuity markets'
completeness () and to the degree of substitutability between g and E for
determining health status.
326.1 Functional forms and baseline parameterization
As concerns the maintenance technology, the strict linearity is relaxed by
allowing for decreasing returns:54
(m) = m  >  > 0; 0 <   1 (64)
This implies that, in both regimes, the steady-state level of maintenance is





. Clearly, Eq. (32) corresponds to the particular
case:  = 1.




 2 (0;1); (65)
h(E;g)  B

g  + (1   )E 
 1=
; B > 0; >  1 (66)
Dierently from the specication in Assumption 1.3, () in Eq. (65) satises
all the requirements given in Properties 1, as it is always between 0 and 1,
increasing and concave in the health condition h, which in turn is a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) function in g and E (see Eq. (66)).55 The
parameter  is related to the elasticity of substitution, which is in fact equal
to: 1
1+.56
For the utility and the production functions, the forms specied in As-
sumption 1.1 and 1.2 are kept. The next step before performing a numerical
analysis is assigning reasonable values to the parameters. In order to do
that, we proceed as follows: since with no annuity markets ( = 0), capital
and the environmental maintenance can be determined autonomously, and
since the evidence for annuity markets is of limited completeness,57, we set
the baseline values for technological parameters ;;A; by initially con-
sidering  = 0. This allows to assign them plausible values abstracting from
the other parameters (see the left hand side part of Table 3). With the coef-
cient  set as standard in literature and A chosen as a scale parameter, the
54Whenever  < 1, Eq. (64) implies that an intertemporal equilibrium with zero main-
tenance cannot be optimal in either cases.
55Under Assumption 3.1,  is ensured to be between 0 and 1 only provided that $ is
small enough. Note, however, that Properties 1 implies an eventually decreasing input
elasticity for  which cannot be met by Assumption 3.1.
56The function expressed in eq. (65) is a particular case of that proposed by Blackburn
and Cipriani (2002). Under Eq. (65) and (66) the marginal rate of substitution between














57See Section 4.4 and footnote 44.
33coecient for returns on maintenance  and the polluting conversion factor
 are such to yield a steady-state share of environmental maintenance over
GDP (m=y) at about 1:27%, which is fairly realistic compared to available
data for OECD countries.58
Table 3: Baseline values for the parameters of the model.
A        B 
100 .3 .01 .8 3 .165 .5 .6 .25 .1
The other parameters are given the values as in the right hand side part
of Table 3. For , which can range from -1 (perfect substitutability) to +1
(perfect complementarity).59, it seems reasonable to assume that health-care
expenditure and environmental quality are only imperfect substitutes and
exhibit some complementarity to improve the health condition eectively;
we take a baseline value of 3 and then we check the eects of allowing for
higher substitutability. About , the same value used in Pecchenino and
Pollard (1997) is kept: this reects the value of private pension funds as a
percentage of US household net wealth.60 Following Ehrlich and Lui (1991),
 is set at 1=2, which represents the case of a quadratic utility function.61
The value for the health-condition technical coecient  is such to reect
a greater weight for g in determining h and to yield a realistic share of
health-care expenditure over GDP. Similarly, the scale parameter B is set
to t plausible values for the g   y ratio and life expectancy. Finally, ,
which is connected to the oor level for , is given a relatively low value,
thus implying that a good health status is important to live longer.
In the rst row of Table 4 we can see that under this baseline parameteri-
zation the g y ratio is at 10.13%, which is reasonably close to the average of
11% in OECD high-income countries according to the World Development
Indicator (see World Bank (2007)). The baseline value for  is 87.76%. As-
58The value for  is chosen also in order to not depart too much from the literature,
where a linear maintenance technology is usually assumed.
59The Cobb-Douglas technology is equivalent to  ! 1.
60See also Auerbach, Kotliko, and Weil (1992). All changes are slightly magnied but
not reversed for larger .
61Pestieau, Gregory, and Sato (2006) based on a survey by Browning, Hansen, and
Heckman (1999) set a parameter analogous to our  to 0.8. We assess what happens for
larger  when we perturb parameters from the baseline calibration.
34suming that a period is made up of 30 years and it takes about 20 years
before entering the working age (the model's rst period), this implies a life
expectancy of about 77 years, which is also fairly close to the average of 79
years in OECD high-income countries according to the World Development
Indicator (see World Bank (2007)).62
6.2 Perturbing parameters and discussion
Given the baseline specication, we numerically assess the impacts of a
20% change of each parameter on the model's variables and on interesting
indicators, such as the welfare level and the shares of output made up of
health-care expenditure and environmental maintenance. The results for
PE and PL are shown in Table 4 and 5 respectively; clearly the interest is
mainly from a qualitative rather than quantitative viewpoint.
Before contrasting the two regimes, we take advantage of the numerical
approach to focus on a specic feature of PE, i.e. the eects of annuity mar-
kets which were excluded under Assumption 1. We can see from Table 4 that
by introducing annuity markets (i.e., increasing ), on one side , E and
the GDP share of health-care expenditure become lower; while on the other
side k, the GDP share of environmental maintenance and welfare are larger.
The rationale behind this nding is that, with an annuity markets system,
agents can be better compensated for mortality risk through an extra return,
which permits to increase consumption. One the contrary, without annu-
ities such an option is not available and, ceteris paribus, agents prefer to live
longer and to consume less. This explains why with a positive  a lower  is
achieved (and hence also g and E are decreased accordingly), nevertheless
the welfare is larger as more resources are available for consumption and
capital accumulation.
Let us move to the comparison between PE and PL. The rst step is
computing the benchmark values for PL steady state under the baseline
setting shown in Table 3. In PL no role is played by , but a new parameter
() must be specied. We solve this issue by setting  such that the same
lifespan as in the PE benchmark case is matched; it turns out that this value
is about 0.85. Table 5 summarizes the results for PL. From the benchmark
row it is conrmed that the same steady-state lifespan of PE is provided
by using more environmental quality and less health-care expenditure, thus
freeing resources for capital accumulation. Indeed, capital is larger in PL
62Note that setting  = 0:1 implies that the minimum level of life expectancy is 53
years, even with a very bad health.
35Table 4: The eect of perturbing parameters in the PE case
g E k m  g=y(%) m=y(%) U
Benchmark 29.88 21.81 23.8 3.28 0.88 10.13 1.27 26.86
(+) -0.02% -0.20% 0.65% 0.24% -0.02% -0.23% 0.05% 0.08%
( ) 2.85% -2.67% -0.01% 0.00% 0.03% 2.88% 0.00% -0.17%
(+) -0.87% -2.00% 0.05% 25.62% -0.19% -1.07% 25.60% -0.23%
 = 1 6.65% 19.80% -0.39% -21.26% 1.52% 8.40% -21.17% 0.35%
(+) 13.63% 11.84% -0.35% -0.13% 1.36% 15.30% -0.03%
(+) 5.50% -7.74% -0.06% -0.02% 0.25% 5.78% 0.00% -0.25%
(+) -1.36% -1.37% -0.04% -0.01% 0.15% -1.12% 0.00% 0.15%
B(+) -8.09% -8.16% -0.29% -0.11% 1.13% -6.96% -0.02% 0.98%
A(+) 13.83% 11.86% 29.29% 38.30% 1.37% -10.98% 6.70% 15.38%
Table 5: The eect of perturbing parameters in the PL case
g E k m  g=y (%) m=y (%) U
Benchmark 24.1 28 99.0 5.6 0.88 5.33 1.41 30.85
( ) -0.81% 1.85% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% -0.79% 0.00% 0.04%
(+) -0.61% -1.75% -0.65% 25.29% -0.11% -0.53% 25.53% -0.32%
 = 1 3.84% 19.93% 1.11% -28.91% 0.87% 4.40% -29.15% 0.59%
(+) 22.57% 23.26% 0.00% 0.00% 2.29% 25.38% 0.00%
(+) 4.04% -9.10% 0.00% 0.00% -0.10% 3.93% 0.00% -0.20%
(+) -1.34% -1.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% -1.19% 0.00% 0.12%
B(+) -7.97% -7.70% 0.00% 0.00% 1.16% -6.89% 0.00% 0.85%
A(+) 14.60% 13.18% 29.53% 38.39% 1.52% -10.29% 6.71% 15.15%
 = :9 3.30% 16.89% 9.22% 3.36% 0.76% 1.37% 0.66% 0.47%
36and consequently also m must be larger, in order to oset pollution.63 Given
that lifespan is the same but consumption is larger, welfare is higher in PL,
which is not surprising since it represents a rst-best approach.
By perturbing parameters and comparing the eects in Tables 4 and 5,
it can be seen that changes have often the same direction but with some
remarkable exceptions. An interesting dissimilarity concerns the health
inputs substitutability. In PE when E and g become more easily sub-
stitutable (a decrease in ), health-care expenditure increases as there is
scope for using g more. Since the weight of the elderly in government's de-
cision is related to g, when it becomes easier to compensate environmental
degradation with health-care expenditure, the government has the political
support to enlarge health-care expenditure and to accept a worse environ-
mental quality (or, put it dierently, it is very unpopular in this scenario to
reduce g). The elderly - by supporting the expenditure in g - increase both
their lifespan and their political weight more eectively.64 In PL instead the
opposite is observed: a higher value for E, a lower g and a lower share for
health-care expenditure. As in PE, g and E can be substituted more easily,
but, dierently from PE, the planner reduces g of benet to a larger E. This
happens because the planner has an horizon which comprehends all the fu-
ture generations and evaluates more long-lasting policies, whereas in PE the
political horizon is shorter and there always exists a strong demand for g by
the currently living old. These dierences are not welfare neutral: whereas
in PE the greater demand for g, though benecial for life expectancy, has a
negative overall eect on welfare (because of the greater reduction in con-
sumption), in PL the shift of balance towards E is welfare-enhancing.
Another remarkable dissimilarity can be found with respect to the pol-
luting coecient . In PL an increase in  implies a reduction in k since,
as we already know from Lemma 3, the polluting eect of production is taken
into account.65 In PE, instead, k is not decreased and it actually rises. In
both cases, since production increases and it pollutes more, keeping a good
quality of the environment is more costly (in fact the m y ratio increases),
E is consequently lower and lifespan is shorter. Health-care expenditure de-
creases as well, because the possibility of using it as a substitute is limited.
63Note that when both k and m increase also the m y ratio increases, because of more
accentuated decreasing returns in production.
64In other words, the steady-state results from a sequence of temporary equilibria where
the support for health-care spending is larger because there is more scope for using g
instead of E.
65Note that the eect of  on k in Lemma 3 was obtained for the general case, without
imposing Assumption 1, and it appears to be a fortiori conrmed in Table 5.
37The overall eect of an increase in  on welfare is thus negative.
The numerical analysis is useful also to assess whether some dierences
between PE and PL obtained under Assumption 1 are conrmed. In this
respect it is interesting to compare the eects of an increase in the risk-
aversion or preference for consumption smoothing (a larger ). In both PE
and PL,  has to increase, thus requiring larger g and E and less capital.
However, the impact of  is much larger in PL. This conrms a nding
implied in Proposition 3: in PL it is mainly  to determine the allocation
of resources in the trade-o between consumption and lifespan, whereas in
PE this allocation is inuenced by a further element, that is the combined
role of aging and political mechanism which boosts g as the old part of the
population increases. Hence,  is fairly less sensitive to  in PE than it is
in PL.66
Moreover, when the environmental-maintenance technology improves
up to the linear technology case ( = 1), a good environmental quality can
be achieved with less m and a lower m   y ratio: people aord to live
longer and the welfare goes up. However, the increase in the health-care
expenditure share is much larger in PE, while the overall improvement in
welfare is larger in PL. This happens because in PE a more eective en-
vironmental technology is combined with a larger demand for health-care,
which pushes up both lifespan and health-care spending thus absorbing too
many resources. A nal dierence concerns the coecient : its increase
makes health-care expenditure more important in determining health con-
dition and, accordingly, g and g=y go up, while E is lower. Lifespan goes
slightly up in PE due to the increase in health-care spending, while in PL
it goes down. The dissimilarity occurs because in PL E is the main de-
terminant of lifespan; if g becomes more important, then the planner nds
optimal to accept a slight reduction in . Note in fact that, though in both
regimes the welfare goes down, the reduction is smaller in PL.
The perturbation of remaining parameters yields generally similar eects
in PL and PE, thus serving also as a robustness check for Assumption 1.
A greater TFP A implies a greater k and also a larger m to oset the pol-
luting eect: agents aord both longer lifespan and greater consumption,
and despite the growth on health-care expenditure, the g   y ratio is lower
because output increases by more. With an improvement in the exogenous
minimum-lifespan coecient , agents aord to live longer ceteris paribus
66Note that, since  directly aects the utility function, for this parameter it does not
make sense to assess the welfare impact, as the functions on which it is computed are
inherently dierent.
38with less g and E and the welfare-level is larger. The eect of an improve-
ment in the health technology B is analogous: in the steady state people
live longer and are better o, aording that level of life expectancy with a
lower investment in g and E. Finally the last row of Table 5 assesses the
impact of . As implied by Lemma 3, it is conrmed that a larger  carries
out a higher level of k and m; lifespan is improved by a larger g and, in
particular, by a higher E, and the net eect on welfare is therefore clearly
positive.
7 Conclusions
Both health-care expenditure and good environmental quality contribute
to improve people's health condition, although empirical evidence suggests
that the relative importance of these two inputs might be age-based, as
the care for environmental quality appears to be deeper and larger among
the young, while the support for health-care expenditure is usually greater
among the elderly part of population. This is likely related to the fact that
environmental maintenance takes generally more time to be fully eective,
although it can last for a longer time. In the light of that, we have tackled
the issue of whether and how an economy where public expenditures on
health-care and environmental maintenance (as well as taxation) are voted
by agents departs from the solution that a social planner would implement.
We have proposed a general equilibrium model where agents' longevity
is endogenously dependent on health status, which is in turn determined by
both environmental conditions and health-care expenditure. In the political
economy regime, a government representing agents' interests in entitled to
the provision of both thealth-care expenditure and environmental mainte-
nance, which nd dierent support according to electors' age. The young
and the elderly electors show dierent preferences towards the composition
of public spending: health-care expenditure nds larger support among the
latter, while environmental maintenance among the former. As lifespan
increases, the size of the elderly enlarges too, thus aecting the policy im-
plemented by the government. In the social planner regime, the variables are
chosen in order to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function, consisting
of the discounted sum of present and future individuals' lifetime utilities.
The general equilibrium framework has allowed to take into account also
indirect channels. A certain life expectancy level is achieved by the planner
through a more intensive use of environmental quality, while the political
economy sustains a more intensive health-care expenditure. A crucial role
39is played by the political mechanism, which makes endogenously high the
support towards health-care expenditure in an aging society. This is also
reected in a resource allocation between health-care expenditure and con-
sumption biased towards the former in the political economy with respect
to the planner regime. While in the planner case it is mainly the degree
of risk-aversion that determines the trade-o between health-care expendi-
ture and consumption, in the political economy this trade-o is much less
sensitive to risk-aversion, because of the \attrition" played by the political
channel. Risk-aversion is also important in determining the combination
between health-care spending and environmental quality, but with opposite
eects in the two regimes, as it increases the weight of environmental quality
in the planner economy and the one of health-care spending in the political
economy.
By means of explicit functional forms and plausible calibration of param-
eters, we have found that also the degree of substitutability of health inputs
has contrasting implications in the two regimes: it shifts resources towards
health-care spending in the political economy and towards environmental
quality in the planner economy, thus hindering and enhancing welfare, re-
spectively. Moreover, it has been shown that in the political economy case
more capital may be accumulated even if production becomes more pollut-
ing; this result, due to short-sightedness, does not occur in the planner case.
Instead, increasing the productivity of environmental maintenance may im-
prove life expectancy in both economies, without necessarily increasing the
health-care expenditure's share of output. Our analysis has also considered
the role played by incomplete annuity markets. We have shown that intro-
ducing annuity markets reduces the health-care expenditure's share of GDP
and life expectancy, but may eventually increase welfare, by oering a better
compensation for mortality-risk.
Extensions of our model are possible in various directions, which can
be suggested for further research. The assumption of a public health-care
system is congruous with most countries' health system and it has allowed to
abstract from individuals' decision-making. Nevertheless, it seems promising
to extend the model to encompass the case of a private health-care system.
Moreover, though we have focused only on steady-state comparison, the
study of transitional dynamics seems interesting as well, in particular within
the political economy set-up. In addition, the impact of specic factors, such
as consumers' risk aversion, development of annuity markets, technology
of environmental cleaning and health production, might be tested through
empirical investigation.
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The data collected for the Special Eurobarometer 217/EB62.1/2004 'Atti-
tudes of European citizens towards the environment (2005) are based on a
survey carried out between 27th and 29th November 2004 by an independent
consortium, on request of the European Commission, Directorate-General
Press and Communication, opinion Polls. The survey covers the population
of the 25 nationalities of the EU Member States, resident in each of the
Member States and aged 15 years and over. The total sample is made from
24,787 respondents.
In each EU country, a number of sampling points was drawn with proba-
bility proportional to population size and to population density. In order to
do so, the sampling points were drawn systematically from each of the \ad-
ministrative regional units", after stratication by individual unit and type
of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the countries surveyed,
according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective
EU- nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each
of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random.
Further addresses were selected as every Nth address by standard random
route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent
was drawn, at random (following the closest birthday rule). All interviews
have been conducted face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate
national language.
The survey mainly focuses on three area: EU citizens' perception of
the environment, questions related to information about the environment
and the importance of the environment in the political decision making
process. As a whole, from the survey emerges a large agreement about
the role that the environment should play in political decisions: almost
nine out of ten EU citizens believe that policy makers should take into
account environmental concerns when developing policy in other areas such
as economy and employment. (p. 33 of the report). Moreover, EU citizens
are highly conscious of the determining role the environment plays as far as
individual's quality of life is concerned: seven out of ten citizens believe that
the environment inuences their lives. Social factors have a similar impact,
while economic factors are perceived as slightly more important (p. 30).
However, EU citizens clearly state they lack information on environmental
issues and would like to have more information on solutions (pp. 14 and
16).
45A.2 Tests for age-biased environmental care
The distribution of the the variable envimp across the age groups is shown
in Table 6.67
Table 6: Importance of the environment in relation to age group.
env imp Agegroup
refusal less than 25 25-54 55+ Total
don't know 1 38 164 222 425
1.35 1.22 1.3 2.48 1.71
not much or less 15 789 2,908 2,329 6,041
20.27 25.35 23 26 24.37
a lot or more 58 2,285 9,571 6,407 18,321
78.38 73.43 75.7 71.52 73.91
Total 74 3,112 12,643 8,958 24,787
100 100 100 100 100
Terms on the second row of each block are column percentages
The percentage of the young for whom the environment is an important
factor of the quality of life (75.7%) is larger than that the old's (71.52%). In
order to check whether such a dierence is statistically signicant we carry
out the two-sample test of proportion, which tests the equality of proportion
between the two groups. The result, shown in Table 7, supports the idea
that the dierence is signicant, so that the young seem to care more about
the environment than the old.
Since the previous result could be aected by data aggregation which
can hide information, we also perform a correlation test between the most
disaggregated, available variables for age (age) and for environmental care
(env imp2). The correlation coecient turns out to be negative (-0.0269)
and statistically signicant at 99%.68 Moreover, if the youngest part of the
sample is excluded (those who are younger than 25, not considered in our
model), the negative correlation is even stronger (the coecient being equal
to -0.0417) and with the same signicance level.
Finally a t-test is performed to compare the mean of the disaggregated
variable env imp2 among the two groups of interest (variable agegroup),
67Table 6, dierently from Table 1, considers the whole dataset, thus including respon-
dents younger than 25 and those who refused to answer.
68Clearly, the test is restricted only to observations when both the variables do not take
values such as \refusal" or \don't know".
46Table 7: Two-sample test of proportion for env imp= \A lot or more" between the young
and the old.
Two-sample test of proportion x (25-54): Number of obs=12643
y (55+): Number of obs=8958
Variable Mean Std. Err. z P > kzk [ 95% Conf. Interval]
x 0.757 0.003814 0.749524 0.764476
y 0.7152 0.004769 0.705854 0.724546
di 0.0418 0.006106 0.029832 0.053768
under Ho: 0.006060 6.8974 0.000
di =prop(x) - prop(y) z=6.8974
Ho: di =0
Ha: di <0 Ha: di !=0 Ha: di>0
Pr(Z < z) =1.0000 Pr(kZk < kzk) =0.0000 Pr(Z > z)=0.0000
as this test is more suitable than the two-sample test of proportion when
the variable of interest can take several values with an ordinal meaning.69
The results shown in Table 8 conrm that the means of the two groups of
interest (the young (25-54) and the old (55+)) are statistically dierent from
each other, with the young showing a greater concern for the environmental
conditions.
Table 8: t-test for means of env imp2 between young and old
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
25-54 12479 1.766969 0.003785 0.422779 1.75955 1.774387
55 + 8736 1.733402 0.004731 0.442206 1.724128 1.742676
combined 21215 1.753146 0.002960 0.431191 1.747344 1.758949
di 0.033566 0.006059 0.021691 0.045442
di=mean(25-54) - mean(55 +) t =5.5403
Ho: di=0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom=18257.4
Ha: di <0 Ha: di !=0 Ha: di>0
Pr(T < t) =1.0000 Pr(kTk < ktk) =0.0000 Pr(T> t)=0.0000
69Actually, the test ts best for continuous variables. Even if env imp2 is not continuous,
it can be tested better by this test than by the test of proportion, where only two values
can be compared.
47B Derivation of the rst order conditions
B.1 First order conditions in the PE case








t+1 = t+1u0(ct+1) (68)
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From the rst two equations it follows that o
t = (Et;gt)
y
t : as aging
increases the relative shadow value assigned to consumption of the old in-
creases as well. From Eq. (70), the marginal improvement brought about
on the environment by a larger maintenance must be equal to its relative
\price", expressed by the ratio of the Lagrangean multipliers. From Eq.
(71), the marginal cost of accumulating one more unit of capital equates the
marginal benet of enhancing next period consumption.
By getting rid of Lagrangean multipliers through substitution, we get:
tu0(ct) = u0(ct+1)
h



































, Eq. (74) can be written as Eq. (20); while,
rearranging Eq. (75), Eq. (22) can be obtained.
Eq. (76) show on the l.h.s. the cost in terms of foregone consumption of
increasing gt for the old; while on the r.h.s. wee see the net benet due to a
larger lifespan. On top of the eect on u(ct), which can be observed as the
48rst term in the curly brackets, in presence of imperfect annuity markets,
two further eects are at work: rst, the extra-return for the surviving
old is lower because there are more people alive.70 Second, there are less
bequests accruing to the young, which lowers their savings. The former
(latter) eect is greater the higher (lower) is the degree of completeness
of annuity markets. Eq. (76) can be simplied by replacing  o
t from the
consumer's budget constraint, obtaining Eq. (21).
B.2 First order conditions in the PL case




































Eq. (77) can be compared to its counterpart in the PE case, which can
be obtained by combining Eq. (69) and (67): qt+1 = (Et;gt)u0(ct). The
shadow value of capital is always less in PE since  2 > (Et;gt), given that
; 2 (0;1). In PL relaxing the constraint on capital accumulation in order
to consume more today is more costly, because more generations are taken
into account.
Eq. (78) states that the current value of the depreciation of E must
be equal to the marginal increase in lifespan due to a better environment,
which has a positive eect in terms of utility and a negative one in terms of
absorption of resources. Eq. (79) shows that the upfront cost of accumulat-
ing capital (the r.h.s.) must be equal to the discounted gain which derives
from a greater production, net of the negative eect of pollution. Eq. (80)
is the same as Eq. (70), so that the PE relation between the shadow values
of capital and maintenance is preserved. Finally Eq. (81) relates the price
70Under the deterministic interpretation this can be seen as the reduction in consump-
tion that agents face in exchange for living longer.
49of devoting resources to health-care to its eect in terms of higher lifespan.
Again, this is twofold: on one side it is positive in terms of higher utility, on
the other side it absorbs more resources.
By eliminating the Lagrangean multipliers through substitutions and
shifting the time notation, it is possible to reduce the system (77)-(81) to
the system (49)-(51).
C Proofs for Lemmas and Propostions
C.1 Proof of Lemma 2
By using (35) in (34) we get
g

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As far as c and E are concerned, they are simply obtained by plugging eq.
(41) into eq. (35) and eq. (40), respectively. Once E is known,  can be
easily computed by replacing the values of g and E.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 3


























50The eects of  and  on k and m are derived from total dierentiation






























In order to have a positive steady state, 0(m) must be larger than .71










Under Assumption 1.4, the rst derivative of (m) is constant and the so-
lution can be found explicitly. If

 = 1   
, both output y and its portion
used for consumption and health care expenditure (=y) are the same in
PE and PL, as can be checked by looking at Eq. (55) and (37); If

 < 1  
,
y and  are larger in PL; if

 > 1   
 the opposite occurs.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4
By multiplying and dividing both sides of Eq. (57) by g and , and using









Replacing Eq. (25) for  into the expression above yields:































71Notice that Assumption 1.4 satises this requirement.
51The steady state value of E can be found by dividing side by side Eq. (82)





1 +    
PL (84)
Using this nding to replace E on the r.h.s of Eq. (83), after some algebraical
manipulations we get Eq. (59).
In order to compare the E   g ratio between PE and PL we take the


















The l.h.s turns out to be always greater than 1 but for very low (and not
realistic) values of , while the r.h.s is always lower than 1 unless  and
PL (which depends positively on ) are very low. Within a wide range of
reasonable values for parameters the inequalities turns out to be satised.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The value of E is given by Eq. (84). Once E is known, g can be obtained
from Eq. (82). Finally, with g known, c can be obtained from Eq. (58).
Eq. (63) can be derived from Eq. (82) after replacing the l.h.s with the
expression in Eq. (59) and some computations.
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